Abstract. This paper analyzes the security of the RC5 encryption algorithm against differential and linear cryptanalysis. RC5 is a new block cipher recently designed by Ron Rivest. It has a variable word size, a variable number of rounds, and a variable-length secret key. In RC5, the secret key is used to fill an expanded key table which is then used in encryption. Both our differential and linear attacks on RC5 recover every bit of the expanded key table without any exhaustive search. However, the plaintext requirement is strongly dependent on the number of rounds. For 64-bit block size, our differential attack on nine-round RC5 uses 2*5 chosen plaintext pairs (about the same as DES), while 2" pairs are needed for 12-round RC5. Similarly, our linear attack on five-round RC5 uses 2*' known plaintexts (about the same as DES), and the plaintext requirement is impractical for more than six rounds. We conjecture that the linear approximations used in our linear cryptanalysis are optimal. Thus, we conclude that Rivest's suggested use of 12 rounds is sufficient to make differential and linear cryptanalysis of RC5 impractical.
A distinguishing feature of RC5 is its heavy use of data-dependent r o t a t i o n s the rotation amounts are random variables dependent on the input data, and they are not predetermined values. The security of RC5 relies on the rotation operation as well as the mixed use of different operations.
In this paper, we analyze the security of RC5 against differential cryptanalysis [l] and linear cryptanalysis [7] . We first briefly review both types of cryptanalysis. For differential cryptanalysis, the basic idea is that two chosen plaintexts P and P" with a certain difference P' = P @ P" can encipher to two ciphertexts C and C" such that C' = C @ C' has a specific value with non-negligible probability, and such a "characteristic" (P',C') is useful in deriving certain bits of the key. For linear cryptanalysis, the basic idea is to find linear approximations (parity relations among certain bits of plaintext, ciphertext, and key) which hold with probability # 1/2 (i.e., bias = ) p -1/21 # 0); such approximations can be used to obtain information about the key.
To attack RC5, one can try to find either the original secret key or the expanded key table S; both our differential attack and linear attack use the latter approach, and hence they are independent of the length of the secret key.
Our differential attack is quite effective on RC5 when the number of rounds T is relatively small, and it recovers every bit of the expanded key table S. The number of chosen plaintext pairs needed for RC5-32 is 245 for T = 9 (about the same a s 16-round DES), and the number of plaintext pairs is 262 for P = 12.
Hence, the number of plaintext requirement of our attack becomes impractical when the number of rounds is large, which is also the case for other block ciphers. We implemented our attack on for certain choices of w and T, and the actual number of plaintexts used matched our theoretical calculation.
A notable feature of our differential attack is that the type of the characteristics used is quite different from the characteristics used in attacks on other block ciphers, e.g. DES. In particular, for a given plaintext difference P' and ciphertext difference C', there are many possible paths (intermediate differences) from P' to C', each with the same probability. (In contrast, while there may be many paths for other block ciphers [4] , generally one path dominates the rest.) These paths are of a similar form, allowing us t o treat them uniformly. The feature has a boosting effect on the probability of getting a plaintext pair with specified P'
and C'. In our linear cryptanalysis of RC5, we construct linear approximations for RC5 and use them to compute every bit of the expanded key table S. Our linear attack on five-round RC5-32 uses 247 known plaintexts (about the same as 16-round DES), and the plaintext requirement becomes impractical when P > 6. We also try to establish an upper bound on the bias of the best linear approximation. We prove that for each half-round of RC5, the best linear approximation that can be alternated with a trivial linear approximation holds with bias 1/2w, and we conjecture that by alternating the two approximations, we indeed obtain the best appraximation for RC5 for the proposed word sizes.
Roth our differential and linear attacks on RC5 are very effective in determining key bits. After enough plaintext/cipherLext pairs are generated, the entire S cable is computed bit by bit without any exhaustive search. For examples, in the implementation of our differential attack, all the running time was used for generating plaintext/ciphertext pairs, and the time for key search (i.e., computing S) was negligible-less than a second on a Sun4.
We conclude that the nominal choice r = 12 for RC5-32 proposed by Rivest [9] provides good security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. Of course, the possibility remains that there are other ways to attack RC5, and further study is needed to fully determine the security of RC5 for any particular parameter values. The remainder of the paper is organized into sections as follows. In $2, we introduce some useful notation. In $3, we present our differential attack on RC5, and in $4, we describe our linear attack on RC5. In $5, we summarize our recent progress in analyzing the security of RC5 with focus on the use of dat*dependent rotations. In $6, we conclude with some future research directions.
Notation
In Rivest's description of RC5 [9] , a round consists of two equations, and in each equation, one of A or B is modified while the other remains unchanged. We will refer to each equation as a half-round. So one half-round of RC5 is similar to a full-round in a Feistel cipher. For ease of discussion, we adopt the common notation for Feistel ciphers and rewrite RC5 as follows.
We will use the above description of RC5 throughout the paper. We will refer to the two equations which involve ( 
3.1
In this subsection, we first describe a general idea for attacking RC5 by analyzing the structure of the cipher. We then introduce the form of the chosen
Structure of the differential attack
plaintext/ciphertext pairs that are used in our differential attack and outline the high-level structure of the attack,
We first observe that RC5 has an iterative structure. Such a structure allows us to reduce the problem of computing the entire S of Lzr. We remark that the basic idea described so far will be used in both our differential and linear cryptanalysis.
We will use the following type of the plaintext/ciphertext pairs for computing Si in our differential attack. Let e , denote the w-bit binary vector which is 1 in bit s and 0 everywhere else. A good pair for S, consists of two plaintexts 
The structure of our differential attack is given in the following pseudocode. At a high level, we compute the expanded key table S entry by entry' in reverse order and compute each entry Si from the least significant bit t o the most significant bit.
The first three entries SO, S1, and Sz cannot be computed in the uniform way as described in the pseudocode. Nevertheless, they can be easily computed by a simple algorithm when Ss, . . , , Szr+l are known.
For i = 2r + 1 down to 3 Obtain a set G,-of good pairs for Si
Characteristics of RC5
In this subsection, we first describe some characteristics for a half-round of RC5. Then we show how to join them together to form characteristics that are useful to compute the expanded key table 5". A characteristic for a half-round is denoted by Q = (ftp, QT)> where Qp = (£(-_ii-Rj_i) and Op -{L'i,R'i)-Generally speaking, if a pair of inputs to a half-round have different rotation amounts, then the pair of outputs from the half-round will differ in many bits. Consequently, we will focus on characteristics for which the pair of inputs have the same rotation amounts. In most of our characteristics, each half of Qp and Qf ls either zero or e, where ^ > lg(u>), implying that the rotation amounts are the same.
We will calculate the probability associated-with a half-round characteristic by averaging over both the pair of inputs and round key 5,-for simplicity; there may be keys for which the probability is higher and others for which it is lower. However, assuming the key expansion of RC5 is good, each round key will be essentially independent, and hence the overall probability of a characteristic for (2r + 1) half-rounds will be closed to what we would expect for nearly all keys. Our implementation results (see §3.4) also confirm this.
The following table lists five half-round characteristics that will be used in our attack. When analyzing the probabilities, we use the fact that for random inputs x and y such that x © y = e, and random key 5,-, the probability that
(e,,e,) (e.,0) (0,e t ) (e,,e ( ) (e t ,e u ©e u )
We note that for characteristics it 3 For the first half-round, there are three characteristics that hold with probability 1: In what follows, we construct characteristics for 2r + 1 half-rounds of RC5, which we denote by /?2r+i-Characteristic Q2T+1 consists of a sequence of halfround characteristics. Since there are many possible values for the parameters of some of the half-round characteristics, there are many possible paths (i.e., intermediate differences (£(•,#(•) for 1 < i < 2r) from P' to C" for Qt r +\, all of which have the same probability p. Let N denote the total number of possible paths for f?2r+-• We define the probability associated with f?2r+i as p rt3p
For different values of r, the following table lists the plaintext difference P', the sequence of half-round characteristics in ^2r+i, and the probability 
-lgH-i)^^^)"*
A right pair with respect to f?2r+i consists of two plaintexts P, P* and their ciphertexts C, C* such that for all 0 < i < 1r + 1, the corresponding difference (L'^Rf) has the proper form specified by sequence of the half-round characteristics for J?2r+i-We remark that for i < 2r, characteristic fi,-, its associated probability p ni , and a right pair with respect to Q{ can be defined in a similar way.
Recall the definition of a good pair for Si in §3.1. We see that a right pair with respect to Qi is a good pair for Si. Hence, the expected number of chosen withres pect to get a good pair for Si . He nce, the expected number of chosen plaintext pairs to get a right pair with respect to J?,-which is at most -gr. 2 (1) The factor j in fi s can be mostly eliminated by taking the carry effect into account when analyzing output differences. Hence the factor does not appear in pfisr+i i n tne table. (2) When 2r + 1 = 3m, the probability associated with the first occurrence of the half-round characteristic O 1 is ^ instead of j£ since the parameter s = w -1.
Using a right pair to compute L' ar mod w
In this subsection, we show how to compute Z, 2r mod w using a right pair with respect to J?2r+i-Similarly, we can compute Li-i mod w using a right pair with respect to 1?,-. Li r mod w = i?2r-i mod w -(t -s) mod w.
Given the ciphertext difference (£2r+i>-^2r+i)> the values oft, «, and v are easily obtained. So we need only compute s in order to get Lir mod iw. In the (2r+l) th half-round, the rotation amount L^r+i mod w (= i?2r mod w) is equal to either (u -t) mod w or (t> -f) mod w. Since u, u, t, and I/2r+i are known, it is obvious which case holds. In the first case s -(v -L 2r +i) mod w and in the second case s -(u -i/2r+i) mod w, and the value of L^r mod w follows.
Implementation of the differential attack
In this subsection, we estimate the expected number of chosen plaintext pairs required to mount our differential attack, and then we present some experimental results. We first recall the structure of our attack described in §3.1. The expected number of plaintext pairs required for computing Si is the product of (1) the number of good pairs required for 5,-(i.e., \G{\) and (2) the expected number of plaintext pairs to get a single good pair (< -fer). From the form of the good pairs, we can see that the chosen plaintext pairs for computing 5,-can be reused to compute Sj if j -i mod 3. Hence, the expected number of plaintext pairs required for our attack is determined by 
We now consider how many good pairs are needed, and we focus our discussions on RC5-32. We can show that |G,| = 2w good pairs are enough to guarantee a high success rate for our attack when r < 11. For r = 12, 8w good pairs are needed due to random noise. (A detailed discussion is included in the appendix.) For RC5-32, the number of chosen plaintext pairs determined by Equation 3 are listed for increasing r in the following 62 We have implemented our full attack for w = 32,r 5 6 on a Sun4 workstit tion. The actual number of plaintexts used matched our theoretical calculation, and the success rate was very high. Each run took about 10 minutes for five rounds and about 12 hours for six rounds. Note that for each Si, only 64 plaintext/ciphertext pairs were actually used for computing the key, and all other pairs were discarded right after they were generated. In addition, no exhaustive search is needed in our attack. Therefore, in our implementation, the time used for computing the S table was negligible (less than a second on the Sun4) after enough good pairs were generated.
Linear cryptanalysis of RC5
. .
4.1
In this subsection, we study linear approximations for a half-round of RC5. We 
I. x = Li-lCB R i -1
The equation has numerous perfect linear approximations. In particular, all approximations involving the same bits of X , Li-1, and a-1 are perfect. All other approximations have bias zero.
Y = x 4K R i -1
The linear approximations for this equation can be divided into two types depending on whether bits of a -1 are involved. We first consider approximations in which no bits of a-1 are involved. Any such approximation involving just one bit of X and Y holds with probability 1/2+ 1/2w, since for one rotation amount, the bits are guaranteed to be equal and for the other w -1 amounts, the bits are equal with probability 1/2. In general, for t = 0,. . . ,lg(w), an approximation involving 2t bits of X and 2t bits of Y (in proper positions) holds with probability We next consider approximations in which some bits of a-1 are involved.
1/2 + 2t/w.
Some of these approximations have a non-zero bias. For example, 
= Y + si
The best linear approximation for this equation is which holds with probability 1. All other approximations are not perfect, and their biases are dependent on the key. For example, the bias of the approximation [s] ranges from 0 to 1/2 and is averaged at 1/4 for s 2 1.
For the first half-round which uses only the + operation, both approximations
hold with probability 1. We will denote them as C and D, respectively.
IV. Joining the linear approximations
Based on the above discussion, we can construct many possible linear approximations for a half-round of RC5 by joining the approximations for the three operations. For example, by joining
, approximation (4), and approximation (5), we obtain the following approximation for a half-round:
This holds with probability 1/2 + 1/2w. We will denote it as E.
Since Li = &-I in a half-round of RC5, there are many trivial approximations which involve the same bits of Li and f i -1 and hold with probability 1.
The following trivial approximation can be alternated with approximation E, and we will denote it as -.
The linear cryptanalytic attack
In this subsection, we show how to use half-round linear approximations C, D, E, and -to compute the expanded key table S. Based on our discussions in $3.1, we need only show how to compute the last entry S2r+l. Similarly as in our differential attack, obtaining information about bits of Lsr is also very useful for computing SZr+l in our linear attack.
We first note that D-E-E-. . . E-is a linear approximation for 2 r half-rounds with the following form:
Since E appears exactly r -1 times, by Matsui's "piling-up" lemma [7] , the above approximation holds with probability $ + &. Let Step 2: Compute T given S2r+1[0]. We observe that for plaintext/ciphertext pairs such that L2,+1 mod w = 0, the approximation
holds with probability 1 and the right-hand side is known. To compute T, we obtain N known plaintext/ciphertext pairs such that Lzr+1 mod w = 0. Let U be the number of plaintexts such that
is zero. If U 3 N / 2 , we predict T = 0; otherwise, we predict T = 1.
Step 3: For s = 1 , . . . for s = 0 , 1 , . . . , w -1, which leads to w x 4w2('-l) known plaintexts for r-round RC5. For RC5-32, the number of plaintexts is 237 for r = 4, 247 for r = 5 , and 257 for r = 6.
A conjecture on the bias of the best linear approximations
We conjecture that for the proposed word sizes w = 16,32,64, the linear approximation for 27-half-rounds used in our linear attack in $4.2 is the best linear approximation for RC5. If the conjecture is correct, we would then be able to conclude that standard linear cryptanalysis is only effective for RC5 with a very small number of rounds.
We have strong evidence for the correctness of our conjecture. In particular,
we show that E is a best half-round approximation that can be alternated with a trivial approximation. We remark that the
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Work in progress
In this section, we summarize some of our research progress [3] in analyzing the security of RC5. In particular, we focus our analysis on the use of data-dependent rotations.
We have studied how the use of data-dependent rotations helps prevent differential cryptanalysis. More specifically, we have analyzed the number of possible output differences of a half-round when the pair of inputs have different rotation amounts. We have proved that, for instance, if O p ( e s , e s ) for s < lg(w), then OT is uniformly distributed in a large set containing at least 2w/2 distinct values. (Recall that for s 2 lg(w), f 2~ only has one possible value (e#,O) . ) The results show that datadependent rotations spread out bit differences in a pair of inputs in a drastic way when the differences affect the rotation amounts. Clearly, the more input bits that differ, the higher chance that one of them will affect the rotation amounts in the pair of outputs. So a good characteristic for RC5 should always keep the number of input bit differences in each half-round as small as possible. From this viewpoint, the characteristics used in our differential attack are the best possible since there is at most one bit difference in Li and at most one in R: (except in the last two half-rounds).
The notion of a "Markov cipher" was introduced by Lai, Massey, and Murphy [4] as a criterion for an iterative cipher to be resistant to differential cryptanalysis. Loosely speaking, an iterative cipher is Markov if there is a way of defining differences such that the probability of an output difference of the round function depends on only the input difference and is independent of the values of the inputs. We have shown that RC5 is not a Markov cipher with respect to the difference measures @ and -. This fact , however, does not imply that RC5 is vulnerable to differential attacks, since the essential property that makes a Markov cipher secure against differential attacks is that every output difference will be roughly equally likely after sufficiently many rounds. For RC5, the output difference of a half-round ranges over a large set of possible values if the input differences affect the rotation amounts, and the probability that this will happen goes to one as the number of rounds increases. Hence, even though it may not be the case that every output difference will occur after many rounds of RC5, the large number of possible output differences would make a differential attack impossible.
We have also considered the impact of certain simple modifications to RC5 in an effort to appreciate which operations are essential for security. For instance, if all additions were change to exclusive-or, our differential attack would be more successful since the change .increases the probability of some half-round characteristics by a factor of two.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the security of RC5 using standard techniques from differential and linear cryptanalysis. We conclude that the choice T = 12 for RC5-32 proposed by Rivest provides good security against both types of attacks. As a next step, we will analyze RC5 based on more special techniques such as differential cryptanalysis with partial differentials and high-order differentials] linear cryptanalysis with multiple approximations [2], and differentiallinear cryptanalysis [5] .
The heavy use of dahdependent rotations is a distinguishing feature of RC5, which provides certain security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. We have also seen that, however, the rotation operation "helps" an attacker in the sense that information about a bit of Lzr can be spread by the rotation in the last half-round t o give information about every bit of the key &+I. This feature of RC5 may also be useful in other types of attacks on RC5.
One of the design goals of RC5 was an exceptional simplicity] with the objective of making analysis easier. In contrast with other block ciphers, all of our characteristics and linear approximations for RC5 were obtained analytically without any aid of computer experiments. The simple design of RC5 w i l l help fully determine its security in a rather rapid way.
However, since a good pair has a fixed plaintext difference P' satisfying Equation l, there is a non-negligible probability that it is not a right pair due to the special difference PI. To see how this can happen, we recall the characteristics for the last five half-rounds in a right pair. The number of non-zero bits in (Li, R,!) for i = 2r -3 , . . . ,2r + 1 are the following:
A pair of plaintexts with difference P' may follow the correct intermediate differences until the (2r -4)th half-round and then have the following number of non-zero bits in the last five half-rounds: (l7 1)1(1>2)>(2,1), 
1),(1>2).
This happens for a fraction of the good pairs, and yields good pairs which are not right pairs. Implementation results and preliminary analytical results show that the fraction is no more than 10% for w = 32 and T 5 11. Therefore, if we generate enough good pairs, we can expect to get many right pairs. The second issue is how many right pairs are needed. In order to compute each S2,.+1[s], G2+l must contain a right pair that is useful for predicting S~~+ I [ S ] .
In other words, Gzr+l must have the following property: We know that a right pair recovers lg(w) bits of S~,.+I and assuming that the S table contains random values, the rotation amount L2+1 mod w is uniformly distributed in (0,. . . , w -l} for a random plaintext pair with the proper P'.
Hence, if we generate 2w good pairs, then on average, each bit Szr+l[s] gets 2w lg(w)/w = 21g(w) good pairs that are useful for predicting its value. With high probability, more than half of the good pairs are right pairs, so a majority vote will yield the correct value of S2rt1[s]. Therefore, 2w good pairs are enough to guarantee a high success rate when pnoise is relatively small.
We remark that as r gets larger, pnaY+l will eventually become smaller than pnoise and more good pairs will be needed in our attack. For RC5-32, r = 12 is the starting point at which pnar+l becomes smaller than pnoise. Simple calculations show that 8w pairs are enough to guarantee a high success rate for r = 12.
